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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
\

JOANNE AJDAMS LEISHMAN,
dba SAMAK LODGE,

I'

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
KAMAS VALLEY LUMBER COMPANY, '
a corporation,

Defendant and Appellant.

CASE
N0.10711

;

APPELLANrS BRIEF
STATEMENT OIF THE KIND OF OASE
This is an action for compensatory damages brought
by the Respondent for implied breach of waITanty, the
basis for the breach of warranty being that the Appellant
is alleged to have furnished Jaminated beams rto the Respondent, which beams were unsuitable and unm.erohantable for the use contemplated by the Respondent and whlch
use the Appellant allegedly knew.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Corurt granted judgment for the Respondent in the
amount of $7500 together with interest thereon at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum from February 23, 1966.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants seek an order to amend the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment to conform with
the facts proved and to reverse to Judgment of t:he trial
court, or in the alternative an order remanding the ca&>
to the lower court foc trial.

STATMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant is a lumber company doing business in
Kamas, Utah, a small town in southeast Summit County.
It engages in the general lumber company business and
manufactures and fabricates lumber products.
The Respondent Joanne Adams Leishman purchas€<l
property known as the SAMAK LODGE in March of 1964
(R 104). It consisted at that time of approximately 10
acres of ground upon which was located a building which
had been operated as a private club known as Samak Lodge.
A point of interest is that "Samak" is "Kamas" spelled
backward.
The lodge was located just east of Kia.mas at the mouth
of Beaver Creek Canyon. The purchase price of the entire
property was $7500. (TR 104, Interrogatory Answer 2)

Mrs. Leishman was familiar with the weather conditions at Kamas and was aware that winter often bringS
heavy snow and ice conditions (TR 122).
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Mrs. Leishman desired to enlarge the existing structure on the property into a tavern and restaurant. To accomplish this purpose she entered into a business agreement with one Ben Dell of Salt Lake City to build and
oprrate the tavern. The agreement, in substance, was
lhat Mr. Dell would supervise and handle the construction
nt ti1e tavern and would operate it for one year, where11ron his efforts would entitle him to be a partner in the
i11dness (R 33, 114).
'ihe new structure was to be built over the foundation
'~: the
i'lOWS

structure that had collapsed because of previous
\TR 21) .

Mrs.
drew some rough plans for the construction oon(empla ted (TR 35, 115). On the basis of these plans they
contacted several suppliers C()ll1cerning materials and to get
quotes. They had determined they would need seven laminated beams of 6" x 12" with variable length size (TR 36).
In this regard they had consulted with Morrison-Merrill
Company and with Highland Lumber Company prior to
ever talking with the Appellant C()ll1cerning the laminated
beams (TR 9, 35, 117). Dell and Claud Thacker measured
the old building and determined how many beams they
would need and that the spacing should be eight feet (TR
06 J. They had been advised that the same could not be
supplied by those previously contacted in time for their oontPmplated date to commence construction. This date was
approximately April of 1964.
In the forepart orf the year 1964, Mr. Dell and

~ishman

Mrs. Leishman and Mr. Dell contacted the Kamas Val-

ley Lumber Company in the early Spring of 1964 ooncern-

tng the proposed construction.

Here the testimony

~
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comes conflicting as to the nature of the contract. The diverse testimony concerning the beruns is as follows:
Mrs. Leishman:

Mr. Dell and she went to the Kamas Valley Lumber
Company and talked with Mr. Weaver, an employee of
Kamas Valley Lumber Company. A:t that time, the fin,i
meeting (March or April of 1964), they just discussed lumber. They did not discuss beams (R 116).
On the second mooting ,March or April of 1964, both
she and Mr. Dell were present and they met with Mr.
Weaver again. They told Mr. Weaver that they had consulted with Morrison-Merrill about the necessary laminat£d
beams and that company could not supply the neroro beams
within their time schedule. She says that Weaver said that
Kamas Valley could supply them with laminated beams
(TR 116). She said that they (she and Dell) told Weaver
they would need eight beams (TR 116). She did not ask
them to design the 'beams for the building (R 122).
She says that Weaver showed them a sample of the
beam, and "the sample appeared to be very satisfactory"
(TR 117) . .A:t the second meeting they placed their order.

Ben Dell:
Mr. Dell's version of ordering the laminated beamS is
considerably different than Mrs. Leishman's. His st.on'
is: That on the original trip in March of 1964, they did not
purchase anything; they merely asked about prices (TR
12). On the second trip, about a week later, he ordered
certain material. Those present were himself, Mr. weaver,
Mr .Bannister, and Mr. Wilde, the latter three being em·
ployees of the Respondent (TR 13). His testimOilY as to
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whaL was said at the time the beams were ordered is: (TR
J4)

"A. The •beams were to be made, that they try to
make delivery in two weeks if possible, because we were
hurrying to try to get the building put up, and they said
they would try to make the two-week delivery; if not, it
may take three. At that time-Q. Was anything else said?

The only other thing was that the studding and
the other materials we ordered would be sent up as we
nreded them."
A.

Mr. Weaver:
Mr. Weaver states that sometime in the Spring of 1964
Mrs. Leishman and Mr. Dell came to the office inquiring
aoout prices for material including laminated beams. He
quoted him a price for the material they said fuey needed
ITR 146). At the time of the first meeting neither Mr.
Dell nor Mrs. Leishman indicated how they were going to
use the material except that they were making an addition
to the lodge they had purchased (TR 117).
Mr. Weaver did not have any other conversations with
Mr. ~ll nor Mrs. Leislunan again until after the beams

had been delivered (R 147).

I
1•

·1

I

!

I
I

Mr. Bannister:
Mr. Bannister, an employee of Kamas Valley Lumber
Company at the time of the beam purchase, testified that
about April 17, 1964, Mr. Ben Dell came to the business
for the purpose of placing certain orders. He knew exactly
What he wanted. He placed an order for three (3) 6" x 12"
x 32' beams and four ( 4) 6" x 12" x 28' beams. He (Dell)
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Said they were going into his construction. He (Dell) did
not say how they were to be used (TR 165). The order
was filled and the beams delivered (Exhibit 38, R 166!.

The beams were constructed and delivered. Some of
the beams had substantial defects in them in that the joint~
had been improperly joined. The joints were finger joints
that intermesh something like the fingers of botJh hands
when interlocked. In this case the imperfect joint was
caused by having one or more of the 2 x 6 boards that
formed the joints upsidedown at the time of fitting and
gluing. This caused a space between the end of the finger
and the vertex of the interlocking joint of the next board
and also caused one of the boards to be raised from the
board to which it was to be laminated by a space as much
as one-fourth of an inch and running several feet in length.
These defects were obvious to all who looked at them.
Upon delivery, Mrs. Leishman and Mr. Dell made C'()Jll·
plaint to the Appellant. The nature of the complaint is

conflicting:

Mrs. Leishman:
Mrs. Leishman says that they complained of both the
appearance and construction of the beams, but that they
accepted the ·beams, notwithstanding these defects, at a
discount (TR 118, 119). She makes no claim that "price"
was a factor in the discount (TR 118, 119.
Mr. Dell:
Mr. Dell sfild they objected to the beams.

H'e admit·
ted they acoopted the beruns at a discount, but he claJinS
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the discount was not because of defective qwtlity but because someone else had given similar beams at a smaller

price and he expected the same price (TR 41) .
~Ir.

Weaver:

Mr. Dell came in and complained of a beam with a
crack in it. This was the second time he had seen Mr.

Walt Carrol, the shop manager, and Mr. Weaver
11rnt up and looked at the beams. Weaver suggested if
1t1ey still wanted to use them they should put bolts through
thein. He offered on behalf of the Appellant to furnish
lhe bolts and pay for the carpenter's (Mr. Thacker) time.
When he left the job site, Den was satisfied with this arrangement (TR 158, 159). After the building was constructed, Weaver told Dell the beams were being placed too
far apart to support the roof (TR 151).
JJtll.

Ward Blazzard:
A short time after the discount was given and before

the credit memos were filed, Mr. Blaz:rerd inquiTed of his
employees concerning the reason for the discount.

T1his
ll'as in the forepart of May of 1964. Upon learning the
reason. he marked the credit memo to read as follows:
ITR 183).
"Adjustment of price due to dissatisfaction in laminating"

All of the witnesses agreed that at the time the defective condition of the beams was discovered, the beams
had not yet been installed in the building. At this time
no one from Kamas Valley Lumber Company knew how

the beams were to be used or the dimensions of the structure.
Mrs. Leishman and Mr. Dell had employed Claude
Thacker and his sorn Don Thacker to help in the construe.
tion. Mr. Claude Thacker was a carpenter with 40 years
of experience. Mr. Claude Thacker testified concerning
the facts. The substance of his testimony was that [;.ell
had a rough sketch from which he worked (TR 175)
When Dell wanted something he went to the Kamas Valley
Lumber Company to get it. He, Mr. Thacker, told him,
Dell, at the time that he did not think the beams were
strong enough for the use intended (TR 177, 180).
As the structure went up, it became obvious to Mr.
Cladue Thacker that the beams would not hold the in·
tended wei~ht. He testified that he told Dell the beams
wouldn't hold ·and that there was too much space between
centers (TR 177).
Claude Thacker testified that when walking on the
roof there was more than a normal amount of spring or
give which indicated a lack of strength to him (TR 177).
He told Dell about it and Dell was unconcerned (TR 177).

Claude Thacker also testified that he had lived in the
Kamas area 22 years and was aware of winter conditions
(TR 177). He advised Dell to put a good strong post un·
der each beam when he left for the winter since the beam
was not strong enough to hold up the roof (TR 190).
Don 'Dhacker testified that the beams were obviouslY
defective and that fact was called to the attention of Mr.
Dell by his father (TR 198). He further testified that be-

fore the beams were installed his father told Dell he would
have to put them on four-foot centers (TR 200) · Don
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Thacker said tlhat when he would walk on the beams after
they were installed they would give an iooh in the middle
(TR 200) , so he and his father advised tDell to put props
or braces under each beam when he left in the fall (TR
200). Mr. Dell argued with Mr. Claude Thacker about the
;;pacing between the beams (TR 202) .
Bath Robert Bannister and Bill Weaver warned Dell
that there was too much space between the centers of the
beams (TR 151, 171). Bannister also told Dell that the
beams should not be placed on more than four-foot renters (TR 171). Dell ignored this advice (TR 171, 190).
The building was constructed generally as shown on
t\hibit 37, which is labeled "roof plan." This plan was
drawn by Mr. William Weaver (Exhibit 36), but to which
Ralph L. Wadsworth, a Consulting Engineer, added beams
"A", "B", and "C". 'Dhe plan indicates tlhat the beams
were generally on eight foot centers with 1Jhe exception of
the angle area whiich had as much as a ten-foot spread between centers.
Both the Appellant and Respondent produced expert
witnesses in the form of engineers, both of whom testified
that the beams, if they had been of average construction,
with expected allowable live load carryiing capacities, would
not, design-wise, have carried the expected load in that
area (TR 83, 130). Wadsworth was emphatic that the
roof would have failed regardlesc; of the quality of the
beam, (TR 131, 135) , and that the cause of failure was
\hat it was inadequately designed (TR 131) and constructed (TR 131) .
The building was constructed and completed in July
of 1964, and operated as a tavern and restaurant until the
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close of the season, approximately November of 1964. Mrs.
Leishman and Mr. Dell returned to Salt Lake in the Fall.
Neither took any corrective measures to brace the beams
or the roof (TR 190).
On or about February 23, 1965, part of the buildino
"
roof collapsed. It was in this part of the structure that
the laminated beams were used.
Mrs. Leishman was the sole witness concerning damages. After being placed on the witness stand four times
for the purpose of proving damages and with some assistance in the way of counsel from the Court on w:hat the
measure of damages is in a case of this nature, (R 49, 105),
Mrs. Leishman testfied that the pmperty was worth $25,.
000.00, (TR 105), before the roof fell, and was worth
$7,500.00 after (TR 105). This is the only proof of damages offered by the Plaintiff.
On examination, Mrs. Leishman testified to the following fucts:

1. The entire property oost her initially $7500.00

(TR

104).

2. Her entire expenditure on the project, inch..'ding
labor for herself and Dell, was $6,538. 29 (TR 104), which
included the following items which had been or could be
salvaged or had not been in the building at the time of its
collapse: (See Exhibit 35, TR 109, 110) Tools, 20.41; safe,
75.00; furnace, 50.00; concrete 236.07; table lamps, 9.68;
antique server, 15.00; windows, 50.00 (one-half of 101.98):
$tove, 67.28; grill, 232.87; sink, 86.30; sink, 78.00; dishe'
and silverware, 1,035.20 (Note: these were stolen before
collapse); plumbing fixtures, 749.15 (Note: 1Jhese are not
even in this building); cooler, 284.62; licenses, insurance and

!
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legal fees, 987.19; doors, 80.58. By her own testimony, the
tntal maximum cost of the building alone, which was damaged, exclusive of the salvage value of lumber, electrical
wiring (TR 108), etc., was $4,057.35.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING TI:IAT TI:IERE
HAD BEEN IMPLIED WARRANTY FROM THE AP-

PELLANT TO THE RESPONDENT OF THE FITNESS
FOR USE OF THE BEAMS FOR TI:IE PARTICULAR

l 1SE TO WHICH THEY WERE ULTIMATELY PUT.

In this case the testimony is unrefuted that the Plaintiff prepared a list of material before ever contacting the
appellant (TR 35, 36, 116, 146, 147, 165). She and Mr.
Drll had contacted both Morrison-Merrill and Hi-Land
Lumber Company, material furnishers in Salt Lake City,
before contacting the Appellant. In this case they ordered
hy sample (TR 117). The furnished beams were patently
defective and did not conform to the sample, and both
Leishman and ~11 knew it (TR 118, 119).

The law in Utah, in force at the time of the Respondnt's transaction with the Appellant, was what we know
generally as the "Uniform Sales Act", Title 60 Sa1es Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
Under this act the follOIWing provisions seem clear and
applicable:
"If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty as regards defects which examination

ought to have revealed."
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In this case the buyer inspected the goods (TR 118,
19), and with admissions on the part of the Plaintiff that

the defects were obvious to her and to Dell (TR 19, 118,
119).

The questions of what duties and responsibilities devolve upon the Respondent by the knowledge she had of
the defective condition of the beams are taken up under
POINT 9, concerning contributory negligence and assum1>tion of risk.
If the buyer bought by sample as she says she did.
(TR 117) , then the only warranty under the law is that
the bulk will conform with the sample.
Implied warranties in sale by sample. In
the case of a contract to sell or a sale by sample:

"60-1-16.

(1) There is an implied warranty that the bulk
shall correspond with the sample in quality.

(2) There is an implied warranty that the buyer
shall have a reasonable opportunity of comparing the
bulk with the sample, except as far a:s otherwise provided in 60-3-7 ( 3) .

( 3) If the seller is a dealer in goods of that kind,
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
free from any defect rendering them unmerohant.able
which would nort be apparent on reasona;ble examina·
tion of the sample."

In this case the Plaintiff concedes that the goods did
not conform to the sample and she received a price adjust·

ment accordingly. It is obvious that 1Jhere could be no
warranty under the provision of 60-1-16.
· 0 rder
The next argument that must be made is that m
for there to have ibeen an implied warranty tmder the pr<>-

!

I
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visions of U.C.A. 60-1-15, the Seller must know the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it must
appear that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judg:
rnent.

It is respectfully submitted that under 1Jh.e facts of this
case the claimed warranty must fail not only under the
question of reliance which will be taken up under POINT
4 follorwing but for the following reasons:

The Plaintiff ordered by specification (TR 35, 36).
She kne-w exactly what she wanted (TR 115). She did
not request the Appellant to advise her concerning where
to locate the beams she had ordered: (TR 119)
"A. I remember them being in contact with the build1.

ing.

Q. But you don't remember anyone from Kamas Valley Lumber Company telling you where to place the beams?
A. I do not."

2. The Appellant had no knowledge of the spacing of
Merely to have known they were for roof support is insufficient to impose liability. The Appellant would
have had to have intimate knowledge at the time of the sale
concerning how the beams were to be used before liability
would ensue.

the beams.

The court's findings of fact number 2 to 1Jh.e effect
that "Plaintiff advised Defendant of the use to which the
beams would be placed" is inadequate to impose liability,
even if there were evidence to support it.
To impose liability the Court must necessarily find
that the Appellant knew not only the intended use of the
~a.ms but the technical manner of the intended use. The
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findings of fact in this regard are entirely silent as to such
essential conclusion. For example, the testimony of the
employees of the Appellant, the carpenter of the Respondent, and both experts was uniform in saying that the beams
would have been adequate if placed on four (4) foot centern, but inadequate otherwise.
To demonstrate more clearly that the Caurt found just
the reverse of what is necessary to impose liability, the
Court struck from the initial findings of fact submitted to
it, (finding of fact number 2) after the words "the beam1
would be placed" the following language: "and solicited
from the defendant their recommendations as to the type
of beam which ought to be suitable and merchantable for
the contemplated use."
It is clear, therefore, that the Court did not think that
the Appellant had more knowledge tJhan the fact that the
beam ordered by the Respondent was to be used to support
the roof. It is certainly clear that the Court believed that
the Appellant made no recommendation as to the type of
beam that might be suitable.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
THE BUYER FAILED TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE
BREACH OF WARRANTY.

The Court by finding of fact number 1, st.ates "That
'
d
the plaintiff and her attorneys gave defendant a due an
proper notice of the failure of the beams and the colla~
of the roof when it came to plaintiff's attention."
. ·
pplicable
The particular language of the code provISIOil a
to this finding is:

15
"But if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails
tu give notice to the Seller of the breach of any promis2 Ol' warranty within a reasonable time after the
buyc·r knows, or ought to know, of such breach, the
S2ller shcill not be liable therefor."
It is respectfully submitted that the breach of war-

if any, became knorwn to the Respondent on approxiNfay 22, 1964, the date the beams were delivered.
Acceptance of the goods after knowledge of their defective
concli1ion i·elieves the seller of any liability thereunder.
Following further the reasoning above stated, the code
turther states:
ranty,

rn~i'._']/

"Where the goods have been delivered to the buyer he
cannot rescind the sale, if he knew of the breach of
warranty when he accepted 1Jhe goods, eic."
While the above provision pertains to rights of rescisoion, nevertheless, it spells out that the buyer's rights acr111e at the time of discovery orf the breach, and not later,
and that is the time when notice must be given.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THJAT THE APPELLANT REPRESENTED THAT THE BEAMS SOLD
WOULD STAND THE WEIGHT OF UP TO FOUR FEET
OF SNOW.

The Respondent blithely prepares a finding of fact
nLUnber 3 stating "1Jhat they (the beams) would stand the
weight of up to four feet of snow with the contemplaOOd
use of the beams placed on eight foot centers."
Nowhere in the record is there any cla.1m that the~
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fendant represented that the beams would stand the weight
of up to four feet of snow. This is a rchild born without
the aid of a mother. There is absolutely no pleading, testimony or evidence to the effect that the Seller ever made
such a representation.
If this is a finding upon which the Court relied to grant

judgment to the Respondent, then we respectfully submit
that we are entitled to have the judgment reversed.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF RELIED UPON A REPRESENTATION OF
THE DEFENDANT AS TO FITNESS FOR TIIE PARTICULAR USE TO WHICH THE BEAMS WERE PUT.
It seems inconceivable that the Court could find that
the Respondent relied upon a representation of fitness of
use under the circumstances of this case. A summary of
circumstances negating reliance are as follows:

1. Leishman knew of the potential snow danger in
the Kamas area (TR 122).
2. Dell knew of the potential snow danger in the
Kamas area (TR 21).
3.

The beams were patently defective (TR 24).

4. Leishman sought a rebate because of the defective
conditions of the beams (TR 183) .

5.

A rebate was granted 'because of the defective con·

dition of the beams (TR 183).
6. Weaver told them to put bolts in the beaillS (TR
158, 159).

'
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7. Weaver told them to put the beams on four-foot
centers (TR 151).
8. Bannister told them the beams would not hold as
placed and to place them on four-foot centers (TR 171).
9. Claude Thacker told them to put beams on smaller centers, that they wouldn't hold otherwise (TR 177,
180).

10. Don Thacker told of argwnents back and forth
between Dell and his father rega.nling the structural defects in the beams and their inability to sUpport the expected load (TR 202).

Thacker advised Respondent to put braces under
beams during the winter time (TR 177, 200).
11.

To have relied on the ability of the beams to support
the expected sn()IW load in the fact of such overwhelming

evidence to the contrary is unbelievable.

This, connected
with the fact that if the beams had been perfect they wottld
not have supported the snow load makes reliance on "implied" quality absolutely imposstble.

POINT V

TH!E COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
BEAMS WERE NOT AS STRONG AS THEY APPEARED.
In finding of fact nwnber 7, the Court found "that said
laminated beams were not as structurally sound and strong
as they appeared and should have been, if properly manufactured."

This finding is difficult 1n understand.
did they appear?

How strong
They had large gaps in them. They

18
were obviously poorly laminated.
properly manufactured.

They were obviously not

We submit this finding means nothing except that the
Respondent must have assumed the risk the appearance of
such beams gave. The beams bespoke of weakness. What
more could she assume from their appearance?
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING TIIAT THE
BUILDING COLLAPSED BY REASON OF DEFECTIVE
BEAMS.

The fact is the building would have collapsed regard·
less of the beams. This finding should have been "tbe
building collapsed because of inadequate design."
Joseph F. Patrick, the Respondent's engineer, testified
that the proper design for this area would have assumed
a "forty-five pound unit for imposed live loading" (TR 83.
An anticipated live load in this area should have anticipated
at least 45 lbs. per square foot, according to Mr. Patrick,
(TR 83), and yet the maximum load these beams would
have supported would have been 30 lbs. per square footu
they had been perfect, (TR 83) and allowing no safety fac·
tor for wood variables (TR 84). Mr. Patrick testified that
the decking would not hold a thirty pound per square foot
live load (TR 91). He further testified that proper wood
design required a substantial margin of error because 01
the peculiar characteristics of wood. Wood is extremely
unpredictable, and in these beams and decking there would
have been no margin of error if they had been perfect (TR
92).
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General design practice would have assumed a beam
ril this dimension composed of Douglas fir lumber, and
11 oulcl have had an allowable 2400 PSI (pounds per square
inch). (Patrick TR 63, Wadsworth TR 127). Wadsworth
testified that had these beams been perfect according to
e1pf'ccecl stanclards and placed in the span that they were,
Eeam 'A" \vould have supported 19 lbs. per sq. ft. allowable load, Beam "B" would have supported 27 lbs. allowable
11\c Joacl, and Beam "C" would have supported 14 lbs. allow; iJJ:: live load (TR 129, Exhibit 37.
In respect to the decking used over the beam expanse,
had 1he beams been adequate it would have supported only
the following:

Deck Span
8'
9'
10'
11'

O"
4"
O"
6"

Lbs. Per Sq. Ft.
Allowable Live Load
41
21
13

4

(TR 130, 131)
Testimony was introduced and pictures were introduced
sho11ing heavy accumulations of snow and ice on the roof.
Both expert \\-itnesses testified that such snorw and ice measurements would have given live load weight per square foot
of greater than 45 pounds (TR 83, 127).
It was clearly demonstrated that under the circumstances of this case the roof would have collapsed even if
the beams had been perfect. It is further evidence that a
0
' ction of the deck span would have collapsed in any event
the beams collapsed.
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Both expert witnesses testified that if one beam or onp
section of decking collapsed substantial additional burden
would be immediately thrust upon the remaining beams
and decking and one would expect further collapse in a
form of chain reaction (TR 87).
We submit that there is not a scintilla of evidence to
support the finding that the roof collapsed because of de
fective beams. Recognizing that the ordinary rule a.pplit'd
to finding of fact by the trial court is that if there is substantial evidence in the reoord to support the findings of
fact, they will be sustained. O'Gara v. Findlay, 6 U. 2d
102, 306 P. 2d 1073. Notwithstanding this rule, we respectfully submit that the evidence is clear that the roof col
lapsed not because of defective beams but because of excessive spacing---or, to put it as the engineer did, "becaUSP
of inadequate design" (TR 131). The Appellant believes
that there is no evidence in the record to support a find·
ing that the roof collapsed because of defective beams per
se. 'Dhe mere fact that the roof would collapse sooner or
under a smaller weight because of the defects in these
beams is not a sound reason to say that the beams were
the cause of the collapse. The proximate cause was defec·
tive design of the building and intrinsic strength of the
beam.

POINT VII

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF HAD NO REASON TO KNOW THAT THE
BEAMS PURCHASED FROM THJE DEIFENDANT WERE
OF INFERIOR QUALITY OR TIIAT TIIEY WERE
STRUCTURALLY DEIFFEITVE

In finding of fact number 10 the Court

'd

Sal: :

"That
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plaintiff did not know or have reason to know that the
beams as purchased from defendant were of inferior quality and laminations or that they were structurally defective."
Finding af fact number 10 requires the Court to igno1e substantial, and in the Appellant's opinion, irrefutable
evidence to the contrary. The evidence that we think
clearly demonstrates the Respondent's knowledge of 1Jhe
defective and structurally unsound nature af the beams
has been partially set out in the argument under POINT
4 above. We respectfully call the Court's attention to the
evidence of the Respondent's knowledge listed in Items 1
through 11 on pages 16 and 17 of this brief.
No point was more adequately demonstrated by the
Appellant and Respondent than the defective quality of
the bean1S and their knowledge of it. Tiris finding, because
of its flight from fact, is especially frustrating to the Appellant.
POINT VIII

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF DID NOT S'E'ITLE HER COMPLAINT CONCERNING THE STRUCfURAL QUALITY OF THE
BEAMS BY RECEIVING A REDUCTION IN PRICE.
Under U.C.A. 1953 as amended 60-5-7, it is said:
"Remedies fur breach of warranty:
(1) Where there is a breach of warranty by the Seller,
the Buyer may at his election:
(a) Accept the goods, ,and set up against the Seller a breach of warranty by way of reooupment in
diminution or extinction of the price.
(2) When the Buyer has claimed and been granted
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a remedy in a:ny one af these ways, no other remPcly
can thereafter be granted."
In the statement of facts we set forth the testimony
of Mrs. Leishman conceming the rebate (TR 118, 119). Jn
addition to that testimony is the testimony of Mr. Blazzard (TR 183), all to the effect that the price adjustment
was because of the defective quality of the beams.
At the trial the only testimony to the contrary was
that of Mr. Dell to the effect that the price was adjusted
because someone else had purchased beams at a smaller
price (TR 41). We respectfully submit that this testimony
(Dell's) is not sufficient to overcome the testimony of all
the other witnesses and especially Mrs. Leishman's. We
think that the testimony of Mrs. Leishman is binding upon
her, especially since she is the party to this action.
It is a fundamental rule that a party may take the

testimony offered by the adverse party in the light most
favorable to him and that the testimony of a party has
great weight against him. See Jones on Evidence, Vol. 4,
p. 1855, Sec. 984, 20 Am.Jr. 1032, Sec. 1181, Fowler v. Pleas·
ant Valley Coal Company, 16 U. 348, 52 P. 594.
In the present case, where Mrs. Leishman admits that
the rebate was given because af appearance and structural
defects, it would matter not if there were an additional
reason for rebate. When she took the rebate under the
code section cited above, she barred herself from any other
relief because of claimed breach of warranty. Her testi·
mony in this regard coupled with the testimony of BaJUlis·
ter and Blazzard should be conclusive against her.
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POINT IX
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FINID THE
PLAINTIFF WAIVED HER RIGHrr TO CLAIM BREACH
OF WARRANTY OR WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN RESPECT TO THE USE OF
TI-IE BEAMS OR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE
PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF USING THE
BEAMS.
All of the testimony above set forth and all of the arguments proffered in respect to the other points set forth
above apply with even more force and effect against the
[Jrindples of waiver, contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Because we have clearly set forth 1Jhe facts
that show use after knowledge of the defect, we shall address ourselves to the authorities supporting our belief of
the application of these defenses.
"As a general rule, damages which have been caused
by the continued use of a defective article, after the
buyer has beoome aware that it does not conform to
the warranty, are not recoverable in an action or counterclaim based on breach of warranty.
In the absence of special circumstances, such as the
seller's insistence on the continued use of the article
or denial that it is defective, or the likelihood of greater damage resulting to the buyer by discontinuing than
by continuing its use, the purchaser has no right to
continue using a defective article, after he has learned
of the defect, if; the result of such use is to increase
the damage resulting from the defect." (33 A.L.R. 2d,

514)

"Allowance to the buyer as damages for the furnishing
of forty pound instead of fifty pound beams of not only
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the difference in value of tJhe beams, but other itenio
of damage, such as setting the beams in the building
under construction, removing and taking out the beams
and rebuilding the walls, on the theory that the buyer
did not discover that the beams were lighter until after
they were set in the walls, was held error in Hawkins
vs. Deitz (1899) 27 Misc. 200, 57 NYS 751, where the
buyer had se€n the beams before delivery and also at
the site of the building, and they were plainly marked
with the figures "40", indicating their weight, and the
buyer testified that he could tell one from the other
"as soon as he saw it." The appellate court observe!\
that the fact that the buyer's employees put the beams
into the building and enclosed them in masonry or
brickwork the morning after their delivery, in the buy.
er's absence, did not excuse him for his negligen<l!
since the acts of his employees must be deemed his
acts. ( 41 A.L.R. 2d, p. 1177)
"The later cases adhere to the rule that a purchaser
of personal property may waive or lose the right to
rescind the contract for fraud, breach of warranty, or
failure of the article purchased to conform to the con·
tract, if he uses it in his business or otherwise as h~
own property, for his own benefit or convenience, and
not merely for testing or preserving it, after he has
knowledge of the grounds for rescission." (Advan<l!·
Rumely Thresher Company, Inc. v. Stohl, 75Utah124
283 P. 731; Knudsen Music Company v. Masterson, 121
Utah 252, 240 P. 2d 973; 41 A.L.R. 2d, 1177, Williston
Sales, Rev. Ed. Sec. 611)

"It is well settled that a purchaser of personal propert;,
may waive or lose the right to rescind the contract for
breach of warranty or failure of the article purchaser
to conform to the contract, if he uses it in his busin~
or otherwise as his own property, for his own ben~fit
or convenience, and not merly for testing or p1~rvnig

,

I
I

it, after he has knowledge of the grounds for rescission. While in many of the cases the fact that the
property, because of the use, had necessarily deteriorated to some extent in value seems to have been a factor in the holding that such use precluded rescission.
there is authority which denies the right of rescission
where there has been use, even though apparently such
use did not result in substantial diminution in value of
the property. Moreover, after an attempted rescission
by the buyer of chattels, which the seller has not accE'pted, the buyer if he intends to rely upon it, must
adhere thereto and act consistently therewith, and if
he thereafter continues to use the property as his own,
he may be held to have waived or abandoned the rescission, and may be precluded from rescinding or asserting a claim that he has rescinded; in other words,
the use of chattels sold, by the purchaser, after the seller has refused the latter's tender of them in a rescission of the contract defeats the attempted rescission,if
the property was used for the personal benefit of the
purchaser, and not merely in compliance with his duty
as bailee of the seller. This doctrine finds support in
numerous cases. It is no excuse for the continued use
and consumption that it was required by the exigencies of the buyer's business, and it is also immaterial
that the buyer, while continuing to use and consume
the property, made objections to the quality. The fact
that the further use or consumption of the goods, after
knowledge of defects in quality, was for the purpose
of establishing evidence of their defective quality will
not prevent such use from constituting a waiver of the
right to return." (46 Am.Jr. 895, Sec. 765)
While the arbove citation refers to the right of rescission, it is clear that the same rule applies to a right of dam-

26
ages under U.C.A. 60-5-7.
terna te rt:medies.

Rescission is only one of the al

"In spite orf his negligence, a seller is, of course, not
liable therefor to a buyer who, by his own neglignt con.
duct, has contributed to the injury. And while the
use of the purchased article in a particular manner
which would otherwise appear to be negligent may Ix
proper where the buyer relies, and has a right to relr.
upon the seller's assurance that it is sarfe to use the
article after he discovers the danger will be held to
have asswned all the risk of damage to himself, not·
Withstanding the seller's assurance orf sarfety."
(46 AM.Jr. 931, Sec. 807)
The question of the application orf the rule of contribu·
tory negligence in a case that fits in a contract category
causes some academic consternation. While there is not
a wealth of authority using the term "contributory negli·
gence", the acts of the parties which give rise to defellS(s
are interchangeably described as waiver, assumption of risk,
and occasionally negligence.
The general rule is that the defense of contributory
negligence, except where the common law rule is abbrogated by statute, is appropriately invoked in negligence ac·
tions, while the defense orf assumtion orf risk is applicable
to cases involving consensual or contractural relationsltlp
between the parties. 82 A.L.R. 2d 1222. At least in the
area orf sale and warranty of seed, however, the cases oc·
casionally talk about the negligence of t:he buyer, 16 A.L.R
896, 32 A.L.R. 1247, and 117 A.L.R. 481. Among the cases
1
cited in the annotations are Paul's Valley Mill CompanY ·
Gabbert, 78 P. 2d 685, 182 Okla. 500, 117 A.L.R. 466 (1938.I
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In tills case the buyer was denied consequential damages

where he examined the seed oats and knew that they were
not the kind he had ordered, but planted them anyway.
Another case cited by A.L.R. is Tomita v. Johnson, 290
Pac. 395, 49 Idaho 643, (1930). Here an experienced potato grower was held to have known by sight that the seed
p0tat0€s sold were not the ones he had ordered and that
rmt of the seed had spoiled and tJhat most of the balance
or the potatoes were diseased. Having planted with this
knowledge, he was not allowed to recover for crop failure.
None of these cases go so far as to state that contributory negligence is being used as a defense. In fact, neither
of the cases just cited so much as mentions the word "negligence", ''due care" or "contributory negligence'', but they
are citerl in American Law Reports under the heading "Ef(Ed of Negligence of Buyer for Failure to Mitigate Damage."
It has also been held where the buyer, by an inspection
before acceptance, might have discovered the defective condition of the seed or other articles, the same result obtains;
however, the cases talk in terms of waiver orf the breach,
not in terms of contributory negligence. 16 A.L.R. 896.
Language suggesting contributory negligence as a defense to breach of contract has occasionally been used in
connection with implied warranties of fitness of livestock.
According to 53 A.L.R. 2d 897, Sec 3(c), inspection and
JJatent defects, where the physical disease or defects of an
animal purchased were discovera:ble by "ordinary care" or
where the buyer had "not exercised due care" the warranty
~not breachd and the buyer "assumes the risk."
lt might be implied that the defense of contributory
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negligence was the basis for the decision in McCormick 1••
Hoyt, 333 P. 2d 639, 53 Wash 2d 338 (1959). Here a re
covery under the theory of breach of warranty of fitne:,.,
of goods was denied to the buyers where ample opportunity
to inspect was offered but refused. The position of the
preceding case has been supported in Utah since Jan.
uary 1966 by the Uniform Cbmmercial Code, Section 2. I
01G(3)b, which supercedes 60-1-15(3) Utah Code Anno- I
tated:

I

"(b) When the buyer before entering into the contr.;1t
has examined the goods or the sample or model :is
fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods
there is no implied warranty with regard to defo:ts
which an examination ought in the circumstances tu
have revealed to him."

/

I
1

1

;

/

The Appellant respectfully submits that regardless of
the label attached, whether it be waiver, assumption of
risk or contributory negligence, the Plaintiff by her con·
duct is barred from recovering in this case.

POINT

x

I
I

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THIE RESPOND· '
ENT SUFFERED DAMAGES IN TIIE AMOUNT OF
$7500.00.

. I

Perhaps the Appellant made a mistake in not shOWJll1 /
what the Respondent's actual damages were, even thougn j
liability for such was denied; however, it appeared to thr
Appellant that the proof of damages was so totally deficient
1
that the Plaintiff could not recover.
i
dent i
In this instance the first attempt by the Respon ·i
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at damages was to offer proof of the earning capacity of
the business (TR 5). The next attempt was to show the
cost of construction (TR 49, 95). It was not until the
Court advised the Respondent as to what the measure of
damages truly was that Mrs. Leishman testified that the
value of the premise before the collapse was $25,000.00 and
after the collapse was $7500.00 (TR 105). No other evidence was offered.
What she took into consideration in arriving at those
tigures was never disclosed. In fact the figures were so
totally mythical as to be incredible. It is apparent that
the Court did not believe them.
If the Corurt did not believe the testimony offered concerning damages, what did it believe? The only conclusion that one can come to is that the Court speculated as
to the Respondent's damage.

The iule concerning damages in this case shoruld have
been:
"In the case of an injury of a permanent nature to real
property, the proper measure of damages is the diminution in the market value of the property by reason
of that injury, or in other words the difference between
the value of the land before the injury and its value
after the injury." (22 Am. Jur. 2d. 194, Sec. 134)
1

Generally speaking, the Courts have said that market
value means "fair market value", and the accepted definition of "fair market value" is:
"The highest price estimated in terms orf money which
the property will bring if exposed for sale in the open
market by a seller who is willing to sell, allowing a
reasonable time to find a buyer who is willing but not
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obliged to buy, both parties having full knowldgt> of a!I
uses to which it is adapted and for which it is capaLle
of being used." (Definition used by General Sen~ee.'
Administration, United States of America, State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028.)
There is absolutely no testimony in this case concern.
ing "fair market value" of the property before and after thr
collapse of the roof.

'Wi L ;out admitting that the~e is any evidence of foi:
market vdae, the1·2 still aris-2s the question concerning the 1
adequacy of proof necessary to sustain the Plainiffs bur
den. In this regard the follorwing citations may be helpfuJ I

"'~ * *

I

To authorize a recovery for more than nomim.
damages. facts must exist and be shoWY'. by the r,1. I
dence ~h~ch afford a. reasonable basis fo1· measw.:n;
the plamt1ff's loss. The damages must be suscept11ile ,
0£ ascertainment in some manner other than by spec j
ulation, conjecture, or surmise and by reference to sow
fairly definite standard, such as market value, esta~
lished experience, or direct inference from known cir
cwnstances. ''
22 Am.Jur. 2d, 46, s~. 26 Restatement of Contract.
Sec. 331.

"The burden of proof, of corurse, is on the plaintiff \I!
prove his damages with rea:sona:ble certanty." ~
meroli v. Austin Trailer Equipment Co. (California!
227 P. 2d 923.

"It is established law that where a plaintiff proves a
breach of a contractual duty he is entitled to darnag~
however when he offers no proof of actual damagr
or the ~roof is vague or speculative, he is entitled 1'
no more than nominal damages." Roth v. Sped>
of Col.) 126 A. 2d 153, 61 A.L.R. 2d 1004.

I
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In the case of Gilmore v. Cohen (Ariz.) 386 P. 2d. 81,
the plaintiffs were given options to buy certain property

by the defendants.

The defendants breached the contract.
The plaintiffs put in proof that if the defendants had hornorerl the contract they would have made the same profit om
the property to be purchased that they had made on the
property already purchased. The trial court allowed only
nominal damages. The Supreme Court said:
"The only question remaining for our consideraLon is
whether, on the basis of the evidence presented, it was
error for the trial judge to limit his award to nominal
damages. The burden was on the plaintiffs to show
the amount of their damages with reasonable certainty.
Jacob v. Ciner, supra; Martin v. LaFon, 55 Ariz. 196,
100 P. 2d 182 (1940). It is firmly established, of
course. in this state as elsewhere, that "certainty in
amount" of damages is not essential to recovery when
the FACT of damage is proven. Story Parchment Co.
\. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 51
S.Ct. 248, 75 L.Ed. 544 (1931); Grumfmel v. Hollen.stein, 90 Ariz. 356, 367 P. 2d 960 (1962); Brear v.
Klinker Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Wash. 2d 443, 374 P. 2d
370 (1962). This is simply a recognition that doubts
as to the extent of the injury should be resolved in favor of the innocent plaintiff and against the wrongdoer. But it cannot dispel the requirement that the
plaintiff's evidence provide some basis for estimating
his loss. This court stated in McNutt Oil & Refining
Co. v. D'Ascoli, 79 Ariz. 28, 281 P. 2d 966 (1955), that
'conjecture or speculation' cannot provide the basis
for an award of damages, and said in Martin v. LaFon,
supra, that the evidence must make an 'approximately
accurate estimate' ~ible."
We respectfully contend that in this case, as in the
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Arizona case cited above, the evidence must make an "a
- -·- · - - - - - j}
proximately accurate estimate" possible. Where th;;;~Y
evidence offered was that the damages were $17,500.00,
that is hardly a basis for a "reasonably accurate" judgment
of $7500.00.

We believe the argument above tendered is even more
convincing when considered in the ligiht that the RespondI
ent had invested only $4,057.35 in the damaged property
within nine months of the date of damage and that such ·
I
figure does not take into consideration the salvage value I
of such material left.
I

1

1

J

I

POINT XI

I

I

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE
APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL AND IN FAILING TO
SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AFTER DISCOVERING
THAT IT HAD MISINTERPRETED THE TESTIMONY
OF W. WARD BLAZZARD, WHICH MISINTERPRETA·
TION WAS THE PRIMARY BASIS FOR GRANTING
JUDGMENT FOR THE RESPONDENT.
'During the trial the Appellant offered a credit memorandum with the notation "adjustment of price due to dissatisfaction in laminating." The memorandum offered by
the Apellant was a carbon file copy extracted from the of·
fice file of the Appellant labeled "Samak Lodge" and COi'·
ering all the material furnished to the Respondent. Upon
the production of the file carbon copy the Respondent ~,
duced a white copy which had the appearance of an ong·
inal and which did not have the notation.
Blazzard, who testified at the trial, was as SUI'P~
as was counsel concerning the copy in the hands of the Re-

I
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spondent, for it left the appearance that Mr. Blazzard had
deliberately used a carbon to make a copy that would imply
to the Court that the original (which at that time the Court
assumed was the one offered by the Respondent) also contained such a notation.
Mr. Blazzard testified concerning how he believed the
error developed (TR 183), but because he did not have all
of his office fiks with him, he could not produce the original
at tl1ai time.
At the close of the case when the Court rendered its
judgment, the judge said in effect that Blazzard went out
of his way to write his carbon copy with carbon-so the
]Lidge did not believe him (TR 208).
At the time of the motion for a new trial the judge
said: "If what Mr. Blazzard said was true, I would be obligated to dismiss the action of the plaintiff."

It was not until the hearing on the motion for the new
trial that counsel for the Appellant was fully apprised of
the feeling of prejudice the testimony had engendered in
the judge concerning this testimony and his disbelief of
the explanations offered. It was because of the strong

stiitement of the judge at this hearing that the Appellant
prepared and filed the motion to set aside the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, which motion was
accompanied by the affidavit of Mr. Blazzard. There is
set forth as follows the motion and affidavit:
MOTION

"Comes now the defendant and moves the O>urt to set
aside the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment in the above entitled case, or in the alter-
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native to allow the defendant td introduce new evi
dence concerning matters of grave importance in :1ie
determination of the issues raised by the pleadings in
the above entitled action.

I

The defendant allege;:; that at the time of trial and at
the time of the hearing on the defendant's Motion for
~ ~ew Trial'. the Court e~pressed itself in saying tli:i! I
if it had belleved the test1mony of Viard W. Blamni i
.
co:;1c2rnmg
t l1e memorandum made on the credit memc I
introduced in evidence, it would have been obligat;,J /
to dismiss the plaintiff's case, and that it felt t:1at the j
carbon entry on the exhibit introduced was a self-sen
ing addition made for the purpose of misleading tl:t
Court.

I

It is the defendant's position that the failure to

intr~

duce the original corpy of that credit memo was the
result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect
and that the original of that document which refute\
the Court's decision constitutes newly discovered e\i
dence which by due dilignce could not have been di>
covered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b) for reason that the defendant did not kn::>w o:
had no reason to believe that the Court felt the \1ir
ness, Ward W. Blazzard's, testimony was false. TIF
Court's expressed conclusion at the time of the hear
ing on the defendant's Motion for a New Trial camei'
a complete surprise to the defendant, and the exhio·
offered is a complete explanation of the Court's em
neous conclusion. This Motion is 'based upon the Aff
davit of Ward W. Blazzard, together with accompani
ing exhibit, and is based upon Rule 60(b) of Utah Rulr
of Civil Procedure.
Dated this 2nd day of August, 1966, at Provo, Utah ;
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AFFIDAVIT
"Wru·d W. Blazzard, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says:
At the trial of the above entitled action, Invoice No.
2200 (Sales Order D8967), a credit memo, was introduced in evidence. There was a notation on the credit
memo which did not appear on the copy of the invoice
delivered to the buyer, Samak Lodge. That notation
stated: "Adjustment of price due to dissatisfaction
in laminating." I testified at the trial that after discovering the purpose of the credit from my employee,
I recorded such purpose on the invoice.
The copy tihat was introduced at the trial was a carbon copy. The sales order pads used by the Kamas
Valley Lumber Company consist of five parts, with
fixed carbons. The first copy is the customer's copy,
which is white. The original is also white and is filed
in our office numerically. The yellow carbon copy
goes into the customer's file and is filed alphabetically,
and the orange copy is the work order and signature
copy, which is filed numerically by sales order munber. The pink copy is a delivery slip given to tlle customer at time of delivery. Usuually the customer's
white invoice copy is mailed to him at statement time.
I am advised by my attorney, Jackson B. Howard, that
the Court stated that it believed that the notation on
the credit memo (yellow copy introduced in Court),
concerning the purpose of the credit's issuance, was deliberately written in carbon to cause the Court to believe that the copy delivered to the customer had the
same notation on it. The explanation for the introduction of the yellow carbon rather than the original
is that the yellow copies are filed in the customer's
file which contains all of the charges and credits to
the custmer's account, and it was easily obtained and
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did not require any office search. The white copi,.
of original entry are filed numerically, and to have
extracted all of the original invoices or sales slips would i
have taken considerable office time. I had no rea,011 !
to believe that the customer's file was inadequate. ft
now appears that the Court believes tJhe customer·, i
white copy to be the original, when in fact the origin~
is attached to this Affidavit and shows that the notJ. 1
tion was made in pen on that document. This nota i
tion was niade shortly after the credit was issued an1J :
before the copies had been separated for filing ann,
posting to the customer's account. The notation 11·::
not made in anticipation of litigation.
i

Had I tJhought that my explanation of the entry mad1
at Court would be misconstrued, without the proour
tion of the original document, the original documer.:
would certainly have been produced at the trial. It
was not until the time of the trial that I discovered tha:
the same entry was not on the customer's white COP!
of the invoice. When I made the entry I did not lmow
that the customer's white oopy had been removed ana

sent to her.

There is attached to this Affidavit the original oft~·
credit memo, showing the adjustment I made shortl!
after the issuance of the credit memo, and an orangr
copy of the same demonstrating the authenticity oi
the original entry, and a complete sales slip set con
sisting of an original and four copies.
f
Dated at Provo, Utah, this 2nd day of August, 196n
The hearing on the motion was held at Salt Lake Ci~.
on the 29th day of August, 1966, on stipulation of counse:
did no
and for the convenience of the Court. The Court
•
•
+n; ed the al
have the file from SUlllllllt County which conu:un

1
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tachment to the affidavits, but he took the matter under
advisement.
The hearing was after the appeal had been initiated,
and was somewhat delayed because Judge Ellett was on
vacation
Judge Ellett, after reviewing the file, made the followmg order, which is set out as follows:

ORDER
"The defendant's motion to set aside the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in the above

entitled case having come on regularly for hearing on
the 29th day crf August, 1966, and the Court having
heard the arguments of counsel and having taken 1Jhe
matter under advisement and being fully advised in
~he premises, and the Court having found by its own
investigation and review of the evidence that the statements contained in the motion and affidavit are in fact
true, but the Court having other good and substantial
reasons for having ruled in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant,
1T IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion of
the defendant be and the same is hereby denied.

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this
October, 1966.
BY THE COURT

day of

While we recognize that a court may not be committed
to oral statements made from the bench, we still believe

that his conclusion that if he believed Blazzard he would
have to dismiss against the respondent was indicative of
his ju<lgment at the time and the prevailing prejudice caused
b:- his belief that Blazzard was trying to put something
0vrr on the Court.
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The appellant has no desire to cast any adverse refltt.
tions upon the trial judge and, on the contrary, counsel con
siders Judge Ellett to be a judge of the highest calib€r;
however, all of us are human. The appellant is reminded
of the standard instruction given to the jury concerning '
deliberations, which is quoted as follows:

"It is rarely productive or good for a juror, upon enter.
ing the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of
his own opinion on the case or to announce a dele'.·
mination to stand for a certain verdict. When one
does that at the outset, his sense of pride may bl'
aroused, and he may hesitate to recede from an w:
nounced position if shown that it is fallacious. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in th'
matter, but are judges."
It is obvious from the Court's ruling that his under·
standing of this particular fact was fallacious, yet he did :
,;, I
not change his position. We believe that in light of ws ~
previous observations concerning the strength of this el~· /I
dence, as believed, against the Appellant, it was an abw 1
of sound discretion nat to grant the Appellant a new trial j

CONCLUSION

~

I

The arguments above set forth demo~rate that tlle
Appellant is entitled to a reversal of the Judgment or. u, ,
ih\! alternative, a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,
JACKSON B. HOW ARD. for
HOW ARD & LEWIS

120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah
Attorneys for Awe]Jant
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